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Abstract
In this paper, we present our investigation into the use of a team of players within a noisy Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD)
tournament. We show that the members of such a team are able to use a pre-arranged sequence of moves that they make at the start
of each interaction in order to recognise one another, and that by coordinating their actions they can increase the chances that one of
the team members wins the round-robin style tournament. We consider, in detail, the factors that influence the performance of this
team and we show that the problem that the team members face, when they attempt to recognise one another within the noisy IPD
tournament, is exactly analogous to the problem, studied in information theory, of communicating reliably over a noisy channel.
Thus we demonstrate that we can use error-correcting codes to implement this recognition, and by doing so, further optimise the
performance of the team.
c© 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The mechanism by which cooperation arises within populations of selfish individuals has generated significant
research within the biological, social and computer sciences. Much of this interest derives from the original research of
Axelrod and Hamilton, and, in particular, the two computer tournaments that Axelrod organised in order to investigate
successful strategies for playing the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) [3,1]. These tournaments were so significant as
they demonstrated that a simple strategy based on reciprocity, namely tit-for-tat, was extremely effective in promoting
and maintaining cooperation when playing against a wide range of seemingly more complex opponents.
To mark the twentieth anniversary of the publication of this work, these two computer tournaments were recently
recreated (for details see http://www.prisoners-dilemma.com/) with separate events being hosted at the 2004 IEEE
Congress on Evolutionary Computing (CEC’04) and the 2005 IEEE Symposium on Computational Intelligence and
Games (CIG’05). To stimulate novel research, the rules of Axelrod’s original tournaments were extended in two
key ways. Firstly, noise was introduced, whereby the moves of each player would be mis-executed with some small
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probability. Secondly, researchers were explicitly invited to enter more than one player into the round-robin style
tournament. This marked a radical departure from the format of earlier competitions where researchers were limited
to entering just one player. It prompted several researchers to enter teams of players into the tournament, and this
choice was motivated by the intuition that the members of such a team could, in principle, recognise and collaborate
with one another in order to gain an advantage over other competing players. In practice, this intuition was proved to
be correct, and teams of players performed well at both events. Indeed, the noisy IPD tournaments held at both events
were won by a member of such a team, entered by the authors.
Now, for this approach to be effective, two key questions have to be addressed. Firstly, the players, who have no
access to external means of communication, have to be able to recognise one another when they meet within the
IPD tournament. Secondly, having achieved this recognition, the players have to adopt a strategy that increases the
probability that one of their own kind wins the tournament. In this paper, we present our work investigating these two
questions. Specifically:
(1) We show how our players are able to use a pre-agreed sequence of moves, that they make at the start of each
interaction, to transmit a covert signal to one another, and thus detect whether they are facing a competing player
or a member of their own team.
(2) We show that by recognising and then cooperating with one another, the members of the team can act together to
mutually improve their performance within the tournament. In addition, by recognising and acting preferentially
toward a single member of the team, the team can further increase the probability that this member wins the overall
tournament. In both cases, this can be achieved with a team that is small in comparison to the population (typically
less than 15%).
(3) Given this approach, we present empirical results that show that the performance of our team is highly dependent
on the length of the pre-agreed sequence of moves. This length determines the cost and effectiveness of signalling
between team members, and these factors contribute to an optimum sequence length that is independent of both
the size of the team and the number of competing players.
(4) Building upon this empirical evaluation, we show that signalling with a pre-agreed sequence of moves, within
the noisy IPD tournament, is exactly analogous to the problem, studied in information theory, of communicating
reliably over a noisy channel. Thus we demonstrate that we can implement error-correcting codes in order to
further optimise the performance of the team.
(5) Finally, we describe how these investigations guided the design of the teams that we entered into the two recent
IPD competitions, and we discuss the results of these competitions. We then go on to consider a number of
alternative competition formats (including ecological tournaments) that have been proposed as a means to reduce
the effectiveness of such a team. We show that in the case of the noisy IPD tournament, our approach is robust to
these alternative competition formats.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma setting
and related work. Section 3 details the team players that we implemented in our investigations and Section 4 describes
the results of the experimental IPD tournaments that we implemented. In Section 5 we analyse these results and in
Section 6 we discuss our use of coding theory to optimise the performance of the team. In Section 7 we discuss
the application of these techniques within the two computer tournaments, and in Section 8 we discuss alternative
competition formats. Finally, we conclude in Section 9.
2. The Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma and related work
In our investigations, we consider the standard Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) as used by Axelrod in his original
computer tournaments. Thus, in each individual IPD game, two players engage in repeated rounds of the normal form
Prisoner’s Dilemma game, where, at each round, they must choose one of two actions: either to cooperate (C) or
to defect (D). These actions are chosen simultaneously, and depending on the combination of moves revealed, each
player receives the payoff indicated in the game matrix shown in Table 1. For example, should player 1 cooperate
(C) whilst player 2 defects (D), then player 1 receives zero points whilst player 2 receives five points. The scores of
each player in the overall IPD game are then simply the sum of the payoffs achieved in each of these rounds. In our
experiments we assume that each IPD game consists of 200 such rounds; however, this number is of course unknown
to the players participating.
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Table 1
Pay-off matrix of the normal form
Prisoner’s Dilemma game
Player 2
C D
Player 1 C 3, 3 0, 5
D 5, 0 1, 1
As in the original tournaments, a large number of such players (each using a different strategy to chose its actions
in each individual IPD game) are entered into a round-robin tournament. In such a tournament, each player faces every
other player (including a copy of itself) in separate IPD games, and the winner of the tournament is the player whose
total score, summed over each of these individual interactions, is the greatest.
Given this problem description, the goal of Axelrod’s original tournaments was to find the most effective strategies
that the players should adopt. Whilst in a single instance of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game it is a dominant strategy for
each player to defect, in the iterated game this immediate temptation is tempered by the possibility of cooperation in
future rounds. This is often termed the shadow of the future, and, thus, in order to perform well in an IPD tournament,
it is preferable for a player to attempt to establish mutual cooperation with the opponent [19]. Thus, strategies based
on reciprocity have proved to be successful, and, indeed, the simplest such strategy, tit-for-tat (i.e. start by cooperating
and then defect whenever the opponent defected in the last move) famously won both tournaments [1].
More recent research has extended this reciprocity based approach, and has led to strategies that out-perform
tit-for-tat in general populations. For example, Gradual is an adaption of tit-for-tat that incrementally increases the
severity of its retaliation to defections (i.e. the first defection is punished by a single defection, the second by two
consecutive defections, and so on) [6]. Likewise, Adaptive follows the same intuition as Gradual but addresses the
fact that the opponent’s behaviour may change over time and thus a permanent count of past defections may not be
the best approach [20]. Rather, it maintains a continually updated estimate of the opponent’s behaviour, and uses this
estimate to condition its future actions.
However, this reciprocity is challenged within the noisy IPD tournament. Here, there is a small possibility (typically
around 1 in 10) that the moves proposed by either of the players is mis-executed. Thus a player who intended to
cooperate, may defect accidentally (or vice versa)1 and this noise makes maintaining mutual cooperation much more
difficult. For example, a single accidental defection in a game where two players are using the tit-for-tat strategy will
lead to a series of mutual defections in which the scores of both players rapidly approach that of random play. This
detrimental effect is often resolved by implementing more generous strategies which do not retaliate immediately. For
example, tit-for-two-tats (TFTT) will only retaliate after two successive defections, and generous tit-for-tat (GTFT)
only retaliates a small percentage of the times that tit-for-tat would [2,4]. However, whilst these strategies manage to
maintain mutual cooperation when playing against similar generous strategies, their generosity is also vulnerable to
exploitation by more complex strategies. Thus effective strategies for noisy IPD tournaments must carefully balance
generosity against vulnerability to exploitation, and, in practice, this is difficult to achieve.
Now, the possibility of entering a team of players within a noisy IPD tournament offers an alternative to this
reciprocity based approach. If the members of the team are able to recognise one another, they can unconditionally
mutually cooperate and are thus unaffected by the possibility of mis-executed moves. In addition, by defecting against
players who they do not recognise as fellow team members, they are immune to exploitation from these competing
players. As such, this approach resembles the notion of kin selection from the evolutionary biology literature, where
individuals act altruistically toward those that they recognise as being their genetic relatives [9,10].
However, to use this approach in practice, we must address two specific issues. Firstly, we must enable the players
to recognise one another, and since the players have no external means of communication, we must use the moves
that the players make in the initial stages of each interaction to achieve this recognition. Secondly, since our goal is to
ensure that one member of the team wins the tournament, we explicitly identify one team member as the team leader,
and have the other team members favour this individual. We describe these steps, in more detail, in the next section.
1 Note that this noise can be implemented in two different ways: either the cooperation is actually mis-executed as a defection, or it is simply
perceived by the other player as a defection. The difference between these two implementations results in different payoffs to the players in that
round on the IPD game. Whilst this does result in slightly different scores in the overall IPD tournament, it does not significantly effect the results,
as, in general, the performance of a player is determined by its actions in the moves that follow either the real or perceived defection. In our
experiments, we use the first implementation and assume that noisy moves are actually mis-executed.
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Team Member
‘team member code’
CCCCCCCC recognise team member
DDDDDDDD otherwise.
Fig. 1. Diagram showing the sequence of actions played by each of the team members.
3. Team players
Thus, as described in the previous section, we initially implement a team of players who recognise one another
through the initial sequence of moves they make at the start of each IPD interaction. To this end, each team player uses
a fixed length binary code word to describe this initial sequence of moves. Specifically, we denote 0 as defect and 1 as
cooperate, and the binary code word indicates the fixed sequence of moves that the player should make, regardless of
the actions of the opponent. This binary code word is known to all members of the team, and by comparing the moves
of their opponents against this code word, players within the team can recognise if they are playing against another
member of the team or against an unknown opponent.2
Now, whenever a team member meets another team member within the IPD tournament, they can recognise one
another and then cooperate unconditionally. In addition, the team members can recognise when they are playing
against a competing player and then defect continually (see Fig. 1). In this way, since the team players no longer have
to reciprocate any mis-executed moves in order to maintain cooperation, they achieve close to the maximum possible
score whenever they play against other team members. In addition, since they defect against competing players, they
are also immune to exploitation from these players. Thus given a sufficient number of team members within the IPD
tournament, the team players perform well, compared to reciprocity based strategies.
However, our goal is to form a team that maximises the probability that one of its members will be the most
successful player within the IPD tournament. Thus, we can improve the performance of the team by identifying one
of the team members as the team leader, and allowing the other ordinary team members to act preferentially toward
this team leader. Thus, when the team’s ordinary members encounter the team leader, they continually cooperate,
whilst allowing the team leader to exploit them by continually defecting. In this way, whilst competing players derive
the minimum possible score in interactions with the ordinary team members, the team leader derives the maximum
possible score in these same interactions. Hence, by allowing the team leader to exploit them, the ordinary team
members sacrifice their own chance of winning the tournament, but by changing the tournament environment, they
are able to increase the chance that the team leader will win.
This approach is similar to the use of ‘master’ and ‘slave’ strategies that were first defined by Delahaye and
Mathieu, and shown through experimentation to be effective in a noise free IPD tournament [7,8].3 However, whilst
the slaves employed by Delahaye and Mathieu were simple strategies that played a static predetermined sequence of
moves,4 all of our team players are sophisticated strategies that explicitly recognise one another and condition their
actions upon this recognition. In this respect, they are also similar to the group strategies entered into the 2004 IEEE
Congress on Evolutionary Computing (CEC’04) tournament by Kienreich and Slany [11].
Now, the case above describes the instances in which the team leader encounters another team member. However,
when the team leader encounters any other competing players it should adopt some default strategy. Clearly, using the
best performing strategy available will increase the chances of the team leader winning the tournament (indeed this
strategy could even make use of the recorded moves of the opponent in order to infer their strategy [18]). However,
since our purpose here is to demonstrate the factors that influence the effectiveness of the team, rather than to optimise
2 Note that this recognition will not be perfectly reliable; the code word may be corrupted by noise or competing players may accidentally make
a sequence of moves that matches the team code word. These are effects that we explicitly consider in Section 6.
3 Note that they used the phrase ‘maıˆtre et escalves’ in their original French article.
4 Delahaye and Mathieu used slaves that defected for the first fifty moves of every IPD game, and then switched to continual cooperation. The
noise free IPD tournament that they investigated allowed players the additional option of opting out of an IPD game at any time (in which case they
automatically receive 2 points for each remaining game round). Thus, when most strategies encountered the slaves they would opt out in order to
avoid mutual defection. However, the master strategy would continue playing until at least the fiftieth round in order to identify the slave, and then
defect against it. They showed that whilst the slaves performed badly, their presence ensured that the master consistently won the tournament.
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Team Leader
‘team leader code’ CCCCCCCC
recognise team memberDDDDDDDD
recognise team leader
CC – TFT – otherwise.
Team Member
‘team member code’ CCCCCCCC
recognise team memberCCCCCCCC
recognise team leader
DDDDDDDD otherwise.
Fig. 2. Diagram showing the sequence of actions played by each of the team players.
a single example case, in the investigations that we present here, we use tit-for-tat as this default strategy. As such, tit-
for-tat is well understood, and whilst it does not exploit other strategies as effectively as the more recently developed
alternatives discussed in the previous section, it is immune to being exploited itself. Thus in the case that the team
leader does not recognise another team player, it cooperates on the next two moves in an attempt to reestablish
cooperation and then continues by playing tit-for-tat for the rest of the interaction.
Finally, since the rules of the IPD tournament mean that each player must play against a copy of themselves, we
also enable the team leader to recognise and cooperate with a copy of itself. Thus, the actions of both the ordinary team
members and the team leader are shown schematically in Fig. 2. Note that it is not strictly necessary to implement
two different codes (i.e. one for the team leader and one for ordinary team members); however, we do so to reduce the
chances of a competing player exploiting the ordinary team members (see Section 7 for a more detailed discussion of
this point).
4. Experimental results
Given the team players described in the previous section, two immediate questions are posed: (i) how does
the number of team players within the population effect the probability that the team leader does in fact win the
tournament? and (ii) how does the length of the code word (i.e. the length of the initial sequence of moves that
the team players use to signal to one another) affect the performance of the team leader? In order to address these
questions and to test the effectiveness of the team, we implement an IPD tournament (with and without noise) using
a representative population of competing players. To ensure consistency between different comparisons within the
literature, we adopt the same test population as previous researchers [6,14,20] and thus the population consists of
eighteen players implementing the base strategies used in the original Axelrod competition (e.g. All C, All D, Random
and Negative), simple strategies that play periodic moves (e.g. periodic CD, CCD and DDC) and state-of-the-art
strategies that have been shown to outperform these simple strategies (e.g. Adaptive, Forgiving and Gradual). A full
list and description of the strategies adopted by these players is provided in the Appendix.
We first run this tournament, using this fixed competing population, whilst varying the number of team players
within the population, from 2 to 5 (i.e. one team leader and 1–4 ordinary team members), and varying the length
of code word, L , from 1 to 16 bits. To ensure representative results, we also average over all possible code words,
and in total, we run the tournament 1000 times and average the results. Since our aim is to show the benefit that
the team has yielded, compared to the default strategy of the team leader (in this case tit-for-tat), we divide the total
score of the team leader by the total score of the player adopting the simple tit-for-tat strategy. Thus, we calculate
〈ScoreLeader〉 / 〈ScoreTFT〉 and note that the greater this value, the better the performance of the team. The results of
these experiments are shown in Fig. 3 for the noise free IPD tournament and in Fig. 5 for the noisy one. In these
figures, the experimental results are plotted with error bars, along with a continuous best fit curve (see Section 5 for a
discussion of the calculation of this line).
Now, in order to investigate the effect of larger population sizes, we also run experiments where we fix the number
of team players within the population to be 5 (again composed of one team leader and 4 ordinary team members),
but then generate competing populations of different sizes by randomly selecting players from our pool of 18 base
strategies (always ensuring that we have at least one player using the tit-for-tat strategy). We run the tournament
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Fig. 3. Experimental results showing the benefit of the team in a noise free IPD tournament. Results show code word lengths from 1 to 16 bits
where the total population consists of 2–5 team players (i.e. one team leader and 1–4 ordinary team members) and 18 competing players. Results
are averaged over 1000 tournament runs.
Fig. 4. Experimental results showing the benefit of the team in a noise free IPD tournament. Results show code word lengths from 1 to 16 bits where
the total population consists of 5 team players (i.e. one team leader and 4 ordinary team members) and 6, 12, 18, 24 and 30 competing players.
Results are averaged over 10 000 tournament runs.
10 000 times (more than before as we must also average over the stochastic competing population) and again calculate
〈ScoreLeader〉 / 〈ScoreTFT〉. Fig. 4 shows these results for the noise free IPD tournament and Fig. 6 show results for the
noisy one.
The results clearly indicate that, as expected, increasing the number of team players, or more exactly, increasing
the percentage of the population represented by the team, improves the performance of the team (i.e. increases
〈ScoreLeader〉 / 〈ScoreTFT〉). In addition, in both the noise free and noisy IPD tournaments there is clearly an optimum
code word length whereby the benefit of the team decreases when the code word length is longer or shorter than this
optimum. Most significantly, this optimum code word length is clearly independent of both the size of the team and
the population. In addition, in the case of the noisy IPD tournament, the results are very sensitive to this optimum code
word length and, overall, the benefit of the team is much less than that achieved in the noise free IPD tournament. In
the next section, we analyse these results and hence propose error-correcting codes to improve the performance of the
team in the noisy IPD tournament.
5. Analysis
The optimum code word lengths observed in the previous experimental results are the result of a number of
opposing factors. If we initially consider the noise free IPD tournament, we can identify two such factors. The first
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Fig. 5. Experimental results showing the benefit of the team in a noisy IPD tournament. Results show code word lengths from 1 to 16 bits where the
total population consists of 2–5 team players (i.e. one team leader and 1–4 ordinary team members) and 18 competing players. Results are averaged
over 1000 tournament runs.
Fig. 6. Experimental results showing the benefit of the team in a noisy IPD tournament. Results show code word lengths from 1 to 16 bits where the
total population consists of 5 team players (i.e. one team leader and 4 ordinary team members) and 6, 12, 18, 24 and 30 competing players. Results
are averaged over 10 000 tournament runs.
represents the cost of the signalling between team players. As the length of the code word is increased, the team
players have fewer available remaining moves in which to manipulate the outcome of the tournament and, thus, this
factor favours shorter code word lengths.5 However, for this signalling to be effective, the team players must be able
to discriminate between competing players and other team players. If the code word becomes too short, it becomes
increasingly likely that a competing player will accidentally make the sequence of moves that correspond to either of
the two code words of the team players. Thus the second factor represents the effectiveness of the signalling. It has the
opposite effect of the first and thus favours longer code word lengths. The balance of these two opposing factors gives
rise to the behaviour seen in Figs. 3 and 4 where we observe an optimum code length near 7 bits; at greater lengths we
observe an approximately linear decrease in performance, whilst at shorter lengths, we observe a very rapid decrease
in performance.
5 Note that the score of the team leader is not solely dependent on the length of the code word, but also on the sequence of moves that it represents
(i.e. the sequence of defections and cooperations). However, the relationship between this sequence, and the score that the team leaders accrues,
is extremely complex since it depends on the strategies adopted by other members of the population, and also the code word being played by the
team members. In our experiments we perform repeated simulation runs, and assign code words to the team leader and team members randomly
each time. Thus, we remove this effect by presenting the average case. However, since the codeword lengths that we consider here are much shorter
than the total number of rounds within the game, and the difference in scores generated by different codewords when averaged over the population
is small (see the difference in scores shown in Table A.2 as an example), in general, this effect is small.
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Fig. 7. Experimental and theoretical results showing the probability of a team player successfully discriminating between another team player and
a competing player in an IPD tournament.
When noise is added to the IPD tournament, a third factor, which also affects the effectiveness of the signalling,
becomes apparent. In order for the team players to recognise one another, the sequence of moves made by each player
must be correctly executed. In the noisy IPD tournament, there is a small probability that one or more of the moves that
constitute these code words will be mis-executed and, in this case, the team players will fail to recognise one another.
The effect of this additional factor is clearly seen in a comparison of Figs. 3 and 4 and Figs. 5 and 6. In the noisy IPD
tournament, we observe the same rapid increase in performance as longer code word lengths allow the team players
to discriminate between competing players and team players. However, we then see a rapid decrease in performance
as further increases in code word lengths make it more likely that team players fail to recognise one another. These
two factors are the most significant and together they give rise to an optimum code word length that is much shorter
than that seen in the noise free IPD tournament.
Now, these two factors that describe the effectiveness of the signalling can usefully be expressed as two
probabilities. These are the probability that a team player will successfully discriminate a competing player from
another team player, Pd , and the probability that two team players will successfully recognise one another, Pr . We can
directly measure these probabilities from the experimental results presented in the last section (where we performed
repeated simulation runs, and assigned code words to the team leader and team members randomly each time), and
then compare them to theoretical predictions.
Thus, to calculate the probability of successful discrimination, Pd , we consider that out of the 2L possible code
words, one is required for the team leader code and one for the team member code. Thus, when we consider the
average over all possible code words, this probability is given by:
Pd = 1− 22L . (1)
In the case of the probability of successful recognition, Pr , we require that both code word sequences are played with
no mis-executed moves. If the probability of mis-executing a move is γ (in our case γ = 1/10), then this probability
is simply given by:
Pr = (1− γ )2L . (2)
Figs. 7 and 8 show a comparison of these analytical results against the probabilities measured from the experimental
results presented in the last section. Clearly the theoretical predictions match the experimental data extremely well6
and these results indicate that the benefit of the team is strongly dependent on the effectiveness of the signalling
between the team members. Most surprising is that, in the case of the noisy IPD tournament, with anything but the
6 Further confirmation of this analysis is provided by the observation that the best-fit lines shown in Figs. 3 and 5 are calculated by postulating
that the shape of the line is given by y = A + Bx + C2x + D(1 − γ )2x . The coefficients A, B,C and D are then found via regression so as to
minimise the sum of the squared error between observed and calculated results. In the case of the noise free IPD tournament, the value of D is fixed
at zero.
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Fig. 8. Experimental and theoretical results showing the probability of two team players successfully recognising one another in a noisy IPD
tournament.
very shortest code word lengths, the chances of two team players successfully recognising one another is extremely
small. At first sight, this result suggests that the use of teams is unlikely to be very effective in noisy environments.
However, the problem that we face here (i.e. how to reliably recognise code words in the presence of mis-executed
moves) is exactly analogous to that studied in information theory of communicating reliably over a noisy channel. As
such, we can use the results of this field (specifically error-correcting codes), to increase the probability that the team
members successfully recognise one another, and thus, in turn, increase the benefit that the team will yield.
6. Error-correcting codes
The problem of communicating reliably over a noisy channel, or, in our case, reliably recognising code words
when moves of the IPD game are subject to mis-execution, is fundamental to the field of information theory [17].
One of the most widely used results of this work is the concept of error-correcting codes: codes that allow random
transmission errors to be detected and corrected [12,15]. Such codes typically take a binary code word of length Lc
and encode it into a longer binary message of length Lm (i.e. Lm > Lc). Should any errors occur in the transmission
of this message (e.g. a 1 transmitted by the sender is interpreted as a 0 by the receiver), the decoding procedure and
the redundancy that has been incorporated into the longer message mean that these errors can be corrected and the
original code word retrieved. Different coding algorithms are distinguished by the length of the initial code word, the
degree of redundancy added to the message and by the number of errors that they can correct. Thus, in our application,
all the team members must implement the same coding algorithm, but now, rather than using the code word directly
to describe their initial sequence of moves, they use the longer encoded message. Likewise, they observe the moves
of their opponent and then compare the results of the decoding algorithm to their reference code words.
The improvement that such error-correcting codes can achieve is significant but we have several requirements when
selecting an appropriate coding algorithm. The coding algorithm should increase the effectiveness of the signalling,
by increasing the probability that the team members can successfully discriminate between team members and other
competing players (i.e. increase Pd ) and by increasing the probability that the team members recognise one another
successfully (i.e. increase Pr ). However, it should not increase the cost of the signalling such that this increase in
effectiveness is lost. The need to limit the increase in the cost of signalling, and thus limit the length of the encoded
message, Lm , is the key factor in restricting our choice of coding algorithm. As shown in Figs. 3 and 4, even with
the perfect recognition that is achieved in the noise free case, the performance of the team begins to degrade when
Lm > 7, and whilst many coding algorithms exist, the vast majority generate message lengths far in excess of this
value [15]. Thus, our choice of coding algorithm is limited to the three presented below:
(1) A single block Hamming code that takes a 4 bit code word and generates a 7 bit message that can be corrected for
a single error.
(2) A two block Hamming code that simply concatenates two 4 bit words and thus produces a 14 bit message that can
be corrected for a single error in each 7 bit block.
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Table 2
Calculated results for the probability of discrimination, Pd , and the probability of
recognition, Pr , for three different error-correcting codes considered
Direct Hamming BCH
L = 3 1 block 2 blocks [15, 5]
Lc — Code word length 3 4 8 5
Lm — Message length 3 7 14 15
Pd — Probability of discrimination 0.750 0.875 0.992 0.937
Pr — Probability of recognition 0.531 0.723 0.527 0.892
(3) A [15, 5] Bose–Chaudhuri–Hochquenghem (BCH) code that encodes a 5 bit code word into a 15 bit message, but
is capable of correcting up to three errors.
Now, in each case, the probability of successfully discriminating between team players and competing players is still
determined by the initial code word length (i.e. the decoding algorithm maps the 2Lm possible encoded messages onto
2Lc possible code words), and thus, as before, is given by:
Pd = 1− 22Lc . (3)
However, the probability that the team players successfully recognise one another is determined by the message length
and by the error-correcting ability of the code. Thus, for the Hamming code with n blocks, this probability is given by
the probability that less than two error occurs in each 7 bit encoded message:
Pr =
[
1∑
k=0
(
k
7
)
γ k(1− γ )7−k
]2n
. (4)
For the [15, 5] BCH code, the probability of recognition is given by considering that the code word can be correctly
decoded if less than four errors occur in the 15 bit encoded message, and thus:
Pr =
[
3∑
k=0
(
k
15
)
γ k(1− γ )15−k
]2
. (5)
These calculated values are shown in Table 2 for the three coding algorithms considered, along with the original
case results in which the direct code words are used (we use the value of L = 3 which was shown to be optimal
for the noisy IPD tournament presented in Section 4). Note, that all of the coding algorithms result in improvements
in Pd since they all implement a code word of length greater than three. However, only the single block Hamming
code and the [15, 5] BCH code improve upon Pr . In the case of the two block Hamming code, the error-correcting
ability is not sufficient to overcome the long message length that results. Of the three algorithms, the [15, 5] BCH
code is superior; it creates the longest message length, yet its error-correcting ability is such that it also displays the
best probability of recognition. This result is confirmed by implementing the different coding algorithms within the
team players and repeating the experimental noisy IPD tournament, with a fixed competing population, described in
Section 4. As before, to ensure representative results, we run the tournament 1000 times and average over all possible
choices of code words. Table 3 shows the results of this comparison when 2–5 team players (i.e. one team leader and
1–4 ordinary team members) are included within the population. As expected, the [15, 5] BCH code outperforms the
others and, in the case where there are five team members, the performance of the [15, 5] BCH algorithm is very close
to the best achieved in the noise free IPD tournament presented in Fig. 3.
In order to demonstrate the effectiveness of the [15, 5] BCH coding scheme, we present results from implementing
it within the noisy IPD tournament (again with a fixed competing population). In Table 4 we show the total scores
achieved by each player when the number of team players increases from 2 to 5. To enable comparison with other
populations, we normalise these scores and divide the total score achieved by each player, by the size of the population
and by the number of rounds in each IPD game (in this case 200). Thus, the values shown are the ranked average pay-
off received by the player in each round of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Within this table, the competing players
are denoted by the mnemonic given in the Appendix, the team leader is denoted by LEAD and the ordinary team
members byMEMB.
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Table 3
Experimental results for 〈Score Leader〉 / 〈Score TFT 〉 for the three
different error-correcting codes considered here
Direct Hamming BCH
L = 3 1 block 2 blocks [15, 5]
Number of
team players
2 1.043 1.055 1.044 1.062
3 1.079 1.101 1.083 1.120
4 1.112 1.145 1.121 1.173
5 1.141 1.184 1.159 1.221
Tournaments are averaged over 1000 runs and the standard error of the
mean is ±0.002.
Clearly, as more team members are added to the population, they are increasingly able to change the environment
in which the team leader must interact and thus they are able to influence the outcome of the tournament in favour
of the team leader. In three out of the four cases, the team leader is in fact the winner of the tournament, despite the
fact that this player is based upon the tit-for-tat strategy that performs relatively poorly against this population (see the
results shown in the Appendix).
In addition, these results clearly show that the mutual cooperation of the other team members also leads them to
perform well. In Table 5 we summarise these same results and show that, in three out of the four cases, not only
does the team leader win the tournament, but the average score of the entire team is also higher than that of any
of the competing players. This result contrasts with that generally observed in the noise free IPD tournament where
team members that sacrifice themselves in order to assist a team leader generally perform poorly [5,8]. In the noisy
IPD tournament, the scores of all the players are much lower (since in this case maintaining cooperation through
reciprocity is more difficult), and thus, the loss that the team members accrue through allowing the team leader to
defect against them is more than compensated for by the gain that they accrue when they recognise and cooperate
with one another. In Section 8 we will show that this difference means that our team players are robust to alternative
competition formats.
Finally, in Table 6, rather than showing the averaged scores of the tournament players, we present the number of
times (expressed as a percentage) that one of the team players actually wins the overall noisy IPD tournament. In
addition to the previous results where the probability that a move was mis-executed was 1/10, we present a range of
values from 0 to 1/5. The results indicate that whilst we have assumed a noise level of 1/10 throughout the analysis,
our results are not particularly sensitive to this value. Indeed, the more significant factor is the loss of performance of
the competing players as the noise level increases. The table shows that with just two team members and no noise, a
team player will win the tournament just 3.4% of the time. However, as the noise level increases, the performance of
the other players within the tournament degrades at a faster rate than that at which the effectiveness of the signalling
between team members diminishes. At a noise level of 1/5 the same team members win 70.2% of the time. Indeed
with 3 or 4 team members, the results are independent of the noise level within this range.
7. Competition entry
The results of the previous sections clearly indicate that there is an advantage to be gained by entering a team of
players into the noisy IPD tournament. However, when using these results to actually design the players for the IPD
competition entries, a number of additional factors must be considered. Firstly, in our experimental investigations
we have averaged over all possible code words to produce representative results. However, for the competition entry
we must actually select two code words: one for the team members and one for the team leader. Since we do not
know the strategies of the competing players, we again use our test population of default strategies, and thus, by
exhaustive test, we select two code words which most often lead to the correct recognition of team players and the
correct discrimination of competing players.7
7 As discussed earlier, we should also select code words based on the amount that they contribute to the total score of the player in each interaction.
To do so requires that the entire tournament be evaluated multiple times for each choice of code word (to ensure reliable results), and is thus much
more costly in terms of computation time than the evaluation of the recognition and discrimination probabilities. Due to this time constraint, and
the observation that the significance of this effect is relatively small, we do not attempt to optimise this feature. However, it would be interesting to
select the code words of the team leader and team members to ensure that not only do they achieve good recognition and discrimination over the
entire population, but they also maximise the score of the team leader when it interacts with team members (i.e. by ensuring that the team leader
defects against the team members more often than the team member defects against the team leader, and by avoiding mutual defection).
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Table 4
Experimental results showing the results of the noisy IPD tournament when the team players implement a [15, 5] BCH coding
algorithm and there are increasing numbers of team players (a)–(d)
Player Score
GRAD 2.347
LEAD 2.344
ADAP 2.263
SMAJ 2.256
GRIM 2.239
ALLD 2.219
MEMB 2.219
TFT 2.207
TFTT 2.175
FORG 2.171
GTFT 2.160
PCD 2.138
PCCD 2.136
STFT 2.124
HMAJ 2.109
RAND 2.101
PAVL 2.099
PDDC 2.072
NEG 2.049
ALLC 1.996
Player Score
LEAD 2.427
GRAD 2.298
MEMB 2.246
MEMB 2.246
ADAP 2.228
SMAJ 2.221
GRIM 2.221
ALLD 2.192
TFT 2.168
TFTT 2.135
FORG 2.126
GTFT 2.114
PCD 2.091
STFT 2.090
HMAJ 2.084
PCCD 2.078
RAND 2.058
PAVL 2.047
PDDC 2.033
NEG 1.991
ALLC 1.934
Player Score
LEAD 2.503
MEMB 2.273
MEMB 2.272
MEMB 2.271
GRAD 2.256
ADAP 2.191
SMAJ 2.186
GRIM 2.181
ALLD 2.161
TFT 2.133
TFTT 2.099
FORG 2.086
GTFT 2.068
STFT 2.061
HMAJ 2.054
PCD 2.047
PCCD 2.027
RAND 2.013
PDDC 2.005
PAVL 2.004
NEG 1.938
ALLC 1.877
Player Score
LEAD 2.568
MEMB 2.296
MEMB 2.294
MEMB 2.294
MEMB 2.292
GRAD 2.218
ADAP 2.164
SMAJ 2.157
GRIM 2.156
ALLD 2.136
TFT 2.103
TFTT 2.062
FORG 2.054
STFT 2.036
GTFT 2.031
HMAJ 2.030
PCD 1.999
PCCD 1.982
RAND 1.969
PDDC 1.969
PAVL 1.966
NEG 1.886
ALLC 1.820
(a) (b) (c) (d)
The tournaments are averaged over 1000 runs and the standard error of the mean is ±0.002.
Table 5
Summary showing the highest and average score of a team of players implementing
a [15, 5] BCH coding algorithm within a noisy IPD tournament
Highest Average Highest
team score team score competitor score
Number of
team players
2 2.344 2.282 2.347
3 2.427 2.306 2.298
4 2.503 2.330 2.256
5 2.568 2.349 2.218
The results are averaged over 1000 runs and the standard error of the mean is
±0.002.
Table 6
Experimental results showing the number of times (expressed as a percentage) that one of
the team members wins the noisy IPD tournament
Noise level (γ )
0.00 (%) 0.05 (%) 0.10 (%) 0.15 (%) 0.20 (%)
Number of
team players
2 0 43 48 44 36
3 36 91 86 79 69
4 83 95 92 91 87
5 90 96 96 93 93
Results are for different numbers of team members and a range of noise levels. Results are
averaged over 500 tournament runs and the standard error of the mean for each result is
±1%.
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Secondly, throughout these investigations, we have not directly considered the possibility of another competing
player learning the code words of the team members and then attempting to exploit them. Within our competition
entries, we greatly reduce the possibility of this occurring by having each team player monitor the behaviour of
their opponent, in order to check that they behave as expected. Thus, if an ordinary team member recognises
their opponent to be another ordinary team member, they check that the opponent does in fact cooperate in the
subsequent rounds of the game. Should the opponent attempt to defect (with some allowance for the possibility
of mis-executed moves), it is assumed that the opponent has been falsely recognised and thus the team member
begins to defect to avoid the possibility of being exploited. Given this additional checking, the only possibility of
exploitation is that a competing player learns the code word of the team leader, and thus tricks the ordinary team
members into allowing themselves to be exploited. However, in the IPD tournament, this is extremely unlikely to
occur. The players within the tournament only interact with each other once, thus, whilst a competing player may
encounter several ordinary team members, there is little possibility of them learning the code word of the team leader
in this single interaction. Indeed, this is the reason for implementing separate team member and team leader code
words.
Finally, we must decide how many team members to submit into the competition. Clearly, our results indicate that
the larger the number of players, the better the performance of the team leader. However, typically, this number is
limited by the rules of the competition (e.g. the rules of the second IPD tournament capped this number at 20), and
thus, we should submit the maximum allowable number of players.
Thus, the teams that we entered into the two recent IPD competitions held at the 2004 IEEE Congress on
Evolutionary Computing (CEC’04) and the 2005 IEEE Symposium on Computational Intelligence and Games
(CIG’05) followed these guidelines and were successful. In the first competition there was no limit on the number
of players that could be submitted, and thus, we entered four different teams. Each team consisted of 28 players, and
used the single block Hamming code for recognition. The teams were differentiated by the fact that they used two
different strategies for the team leaders, and two different strategies for the team members. Whilst a number of other
researchers entered teams of players into this competitions, the policy was not widely adopted, and thus, the team
leader that employed tit-for-tat as a default strategy won the competition by a significant margin (it scored 13% more
than the second placed competing player).
In the second competition (held at the 2005 IEEE Symposium on Computational Intelligence and Games) a fixed
limit of 20 players per institution was established, and thus, we entered a single team using the more complex [15, 5]
BCH coding scheme. As per our investigations here, we used tit-for-tat as the default strategy of the team leader. In this
competition, separate noise free and noisy IPD tournaments were held, and these tournaments were more competitive,
as given the results of the first competition, many more researchers adopted the policy of submitting a team of players.
Within the noise free IPD tournament, three of the top four positions were occupied by representatives of different
teams. However, within the noisy IPD tournament, our team leader again won with a clear advantage (averaged over
five runs, it scored 5%more than the second placed competing player), despite using the tit-for-tat as a default strategy.
The other teams entered into this tournament performed poorly compared to the noise free IPD tournament, clearly
illustrating the advantage that the use of error-correcting codes yielded by enabling our team players to recognise one
another in the noisy environment.
8. Alternative competition formats
The prevalence and success of team players within the two computer tournaments discussed in this paper has
initiated research into alternative competition formats that reduce the effectiveness of this approach. Baranski et al.
describe three modified competition formats, and show that in the case of the noise free IPD tournament they are all
moderately effective at reducing the effectiveness of team players [5]. Specifically, they consider three formats:
Ecological A competition format where repeated round-robin tournaments are held (each with the same fixed
population size). A player’s progression into the next round-robin tournament is dependent on the score
they achieved in the previous one, with high scoring players being represented multiple times within the
new population. The competition continues until a single player has monopolised the population (i.e. the
population consists of multiple copies of this single player).
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Table 7
Experimental results showing the number of times (expressed as a percentage) that one of the team
members wins each of the four different competition formats
Round-robin Ecological Remove worst Remove worst
tournament (%) (%) overall (%) (%)
Number of
team players
2 48 61 77 46
3 86 77 100 49
4 92 88 100 51
5 96 94 100 55
Results are averaged over 500 tournament runs and the standard error of the mean for each result
is ±1%.
Remove Worst Overall A competition in which repeated round-robin tournaments are held, but after each round-
robin tournament the lowest scoring player summed over all round-robin tournaments held so far is removed.
Unlike the ecological competition, the population size reduces over time, and the competition continues until
just one player survives.
Remove Worst A more severe form of the preceding competition whereby the lowest scoring player in the current
round-robin tournament (not the lowest scoring over all round-robin tournaments held so far) is removed
after each round. Again, the competition continues until just one player survives.
The rationale for such environments is that team members who are sacrificing themselves by allowing the team leader
to defect against them will perform poorly in any single round-robin tournament, and will thus be removed from
the population. In doing so, they remove the advantage that the team leader accrues from these players in future
round-robin tournaments.
However, whilst this approach is valid in a noise free IPD tournament, it is not valid for the noisy IPD tournament
that we consider here. Our team members do not perform poorly. Rather, as shown in Table 4, they typically occupy
the top ranks of the population after the team leader. This difference can be understood by the fact that within
the noise free IPD tournament, many strategies are able to maintain mutual cooperation through reciprocity (e.g.
TFT). However, in the noisy IPD tournament this is not the case, and the scores that the strategies achieve in each
interaction are much lower (see Table A.2 for a comparison). However, our team members are able to recognise one
another and achieve mutual cooperation despite the noise. Thus, the loss that they accrue through allowing the team
leader to defect against them, is more than compensated by the gain they accrue when they interact with other team
members.
Thus, in the case of the noisy IPD tournaments, removing poorly performing players does not remove the
team members from the population, and should not reduce the effectiveness of the team. To test this hypothesis
we implemented the three alternative competition formats and compared the results with the standard round-robin
tournament presented earlier.8 Table 7 shows the results of these experiments. In the case of the Remove Worst
Overall format, we see a significant increase in the effectiveness of the team players. Indeed, when there are three
or more team players (one team leader and two or more team members), the team leader wins every competition.
By removing the worst performing player at each stage the team players gradually represent a greater fraction of the
population, and thus the team leader gains greater benefit in each subsequent round-robin tournament (see the results
shown in Figs. 3–6).
In the case of the Ecological format we see a small reduction in the number of times that a team players wins
the competition, and a greater reduction in the case of the Remove Worst format. In both cases, the selection of
team players for the next generation, and the removal of the worst performing player, are based on the results of a
single round-robin tournament, and thus significant randomness is introduced into the results. This randomness is
8 Note that there are several ways of implementing the selection of population members in the ecological competition. Baranski et al. consider
an infinite population and use the results of each round-robin tournament to calculate the fraction of the population represented by each player [5].
In contrast, we implement a true ecological tournament with a finite population size. After each round-robin tournament, we select the next
generation by randomly drawing pairs of players from the current population, comparing the total scores they achieved in the previous round-
robin tournament, and selecting the higher scoring one. This selection scheme is commonly used within evolutionary algorithms and is known as
tournament selection [16]. We repeat this process until we have the required number of players in the next generation, and then use these players
within the next round-robin tournament.
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greater in the Remove Worst format due to the decreasing population size, and hence we see worse results in this
format. However, in both cases, the team players are still the most successful strategies with the population.9 Thus our
team players are robust to these alternative competition formats, and indeed, if repeated round-robin tournaments are
used to remove the randomness within the Ecological and Remove Worst formats, we actually see an increase in the
effectiveness of our team players over all three formats.
9. Conclusions
In this paper, we presented our investigations into the use of a team of players within an Iterated Prisoner’s
Dilemma tournament. We have shown that if the team players are capable of recognising one another, they can
condition their actions to increase the probability that one of their members wins the tournament. Since outside
means of communication are not available to these players, we have shown that they are able to make use of a
covert channel (specifically, a pre-agreed sequence of moves that they make at the start of each interaction) to signal
to one another and thus perform this recognition. By carefully considering both the cost and effectiveness of the
signalling, we have shown that we can use error-correcting codes to optimise the performance of the team and that
this coding allows the teams to be extremely effective in the noisy IPD tournament, a noisy environment which initially
appears to preclude their use. Finally, we have shown that our team approach is robust to different competition
formats, even those that have been shown to reduce the effectiveness of such teams within the noise free IPD
tournament.
Our future work in this area considers an extension of the ecological competition format presented in Section 8.
Within this environment we are particularly interested in searching for evolutionary stable strategies (ESS), and thus
are interested whether an explicit team leader is required, and how team players may attempt to exploit other team
players to their own advantage. As such, this work attempts to compare the roles of kin selection and reciprocity for
maintaining cooperation in noisy environments.
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Appendix. Test population
The test population consists of eighteen players implementing the base strategies used in Axelrod’s original
competition (e.g. All C, All D, Random and Negative), simple strategies that play periodic moves (e.g. periodic
CD, CCD and DDC), and state-of-the-art strategies that have been shown to outperform these simple strategies (e.g.
Adaptive, Forgiving and Gradual). A full list and description of the strategies adopted by these players is shown in
Table A.1.
In addition to this description, Table A.2 shows the results of running noise free and noisy IPD tournaments using
just these players. To ensure repeatable results, we run the tournament 1000 times and present the average results. To
allow easy comparison with other publications, the scores in this table are normalised and are thus divided by the size
of the population and by the number of rounds in each IPD game (in this case 200). Thus, the values shown are the
ranked average pay-off received by the player in each round of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game.
Note, that in this population, tit-for-tat performs relatively poorly and is easily beaten by a number of strategies.
Most notably, the strategies named Adaptive and Gradual clearly outperform the simpler strategies [6,20]. In addition,
in general the scores in the noisy IPD tournament are less than those in the noise free tournament, since it is far harder
to ensure mutual cooperation in the presence of accidental defections.
9 In the case of the Remove Worst format with one team leader and four team members, the next most successful player is Generous Tit-For-Tat
which wins only 20% of the competitions.
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Table A.1
Description of strategies adopted by the competing players in the test population
Strategy Name Description
Adaptive ADAP Uses a continuously updated estimate of the opponent player’s
propensity to defect to condition future actions [20].
All C ALLC Cooperates continually.
All D ALLD Defects continually.
Forgiving FORG Modified tit-for-tat strategy that attempts to reestablish mutual
cooperation after a sequence of mutual defections [14].
Gradual GRAD Modified tit-for-tat strategy that use progressively longer sequences
of defections in retaliation [6].
Grim GRIM Cooperates until a strategy defects against it. From that point on
defects continually.
Generous tit-for-tat GTFT Like tit-for-tat but cooperates 1/3 of the times that tit-for-tat would
defect [4].
Hard majority HMAJ Plays the majority move of the opponent. On the first move, or a
tie, it cooperates.
Negative NEG Plays the negative of the opponents last move.
Pavlov PAVL Plays win-stay, lose-shift [13].
Periodic CD PCD Plays ‘cooperate, defect’ periodically.
Periodic CCD PCCD Plays ‘cooperate, cooperate, defect’ periodically.
Periodic DDC PDDC Plays ‘defect, defect, cooperate’ periodically.
Random RAND Cooperates and defects at random.
Suspicious tit-for-tat STFT Identical to tit-for-tat but starts by defecting.
Soft majority SMAJ Plays the majority move of the opponent. On the first move, or a
tie, it defects.
Tit-for-tat TFT Starts by cooperating and then plays the last move of the opponent.
Tit-for-two-tats TFTT Like tit-for-tat but only defects after two consecutive defections
against it.
Table A.2
Reference performance of the test population in the
(a) noise free and (b) noisy IPD tournament
Strategy Score
ADAP 2.888
GRAD 2.860
GRIM 2.773
TFT 2.647
FORG 2.627
GTFT 2.591
SMAJ 2.575
TFTT 2.544
PAVL 2.390
ALLC 2.332
PCD 2.279
HMAJ 2.277
STFT 2.233
PCCD 2.190
ALLD 2.175
RAND 2.114
NEG 2.111
PDDC 2.081
Strategy Score
GRAD 2.410
ADAP 2.329
GRIM 2.297
SMAJ 2.292
ALLD 2.278
TFT 2.245
FORG 2.211
TFTT 2.204
GTFT 2.198
PCCD 2.185
PCD 2.179
STFT 2.155
RAND 2.143
PAVL 2.140
HMAJ 2.134
NEG 2.112
PDDC 2.110
ALLC 2.043
(a) (b)
Results are averaged over 1000 repeated tournaments
and the standard error of the mean is ±0.002.
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